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RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL
In a recent case, Blue v. State," the defendant shoved or pushed
the complaining witness, Burgess, in the chest to prevent him crossing
a picket barricade. No serious bodily harm was sustained by Burgess;
but he was frustrated in his effort to enter the plant where he was
employed.
In a prosecution for assault and battery the trial court found the
defendant guilty and fixed a penalty of $1000.00 fine and six months
imprisonment-the maximum penalty allowed under the statute.2 During
the trial, the prosecutor made frequent references to the fact that the
accused was a striker, a "saboteur", and that the defendant and his
witnesses were hoodlums and worse than German spies. The prosecutor
in a final appeal to the jurors to give the defendant "the full extent of
the law", reminded them to think of his son and their sons and daugh-
ters who were overseas. The cross examination of the defendant's
witnesses was pursued in like manner and consisted mainly of questions
and statements calculated to reveal their "soft jobs", "good salaries"
and draft status.$
Blue's counsel made no objection to either the cross examination
or the argument of the prosecuting attorney, nor was any motion
made to dismiss the jury. On appeal by new counsel Blue set out as
grounds for reversal the prejudicial argument and misconduct of the
prosecuting attorney in the trial court. The Indiana Supreme Court
affirmed the decision with Richman, J., dissenting. The latter in a
very pointed dissent conceded the guilt of the defendant but deplored
the conduct of the trial court in its failure to discharge its duty by
securing of its own initiative a fair and impartial trial." The majority
see 2 Beale, op. cit. supra n. 10 at 1091, "There can be only one
place in which a contract is made, and that place can never be
subject to great or serious doubt." (3) Why give one act, e.g.,
acceptance, more weight than another, e.g., offer, in determining
questions of contract? (4) The dividing line between questions of
obligation and performance is not a clear one nor always logical.
Restatement, "Conflict of Laws" (1934) § 358, comment b. For
further discussion, see Cook, op. cit. supra n. 12, c. 8, 14, 15.
1. 67 N.E. (2d) 377 (Ind. 1946).
2. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 10-403.
3. Blue's case was tried during the Battle of the Bulge when the
United States and Allied war effort hung in the balance and at a time
when the fires of public sentiment against strikes and strikers were
being fanned by various newspapers and radio commentators. The
atmosphere in which the trial was conducted was reminiscent of
World War I draft board bribery cases tried during war time, e.g.,
August v. U.S., 257 Fed. 388 (C.C.A. 8th, 1918).
4. When prejudicial appeals are being made to the jury and defense
counsel remains silent, the duties of the trial court are drawn into
issue. The question becomes whether the judge of his own initiative
should take such action as may be necessary to assure a fair and
impartial trial. While an early Indiana case, The St. Louis and
South-Eastern Ry. v. Myrtle, 51 Ind. 566 (1875), has denied this
duty of the trial court in such situations, other courts have recog-
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did nor concede that these arguments of the prosecutor were inflam-
matory or improper but rather justified these statements as necessary
for the jury whose duty it was to fix the penalty.5 The court further
nized that such a sua sponte duty exists. Aetna Life Insurance Co.
v. Kelley, 70 F. (2d) 589 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934); Collins v. State, 100
Miss. 435, 56 So. 527 (1911); Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28
Am. Rep. 582 (1878). The concept has been thus stated by Judge
Learned Hand: "A judge, at least in a Federal Court, is more
than a moderator. He is affirmatively charged with securing a
fair trial, and must intervene sua sponte to that end when necessary.
It is not enough that the other side does not protest; often protest
will only serve to emphasize the evil". Brown v. Walter, 62 F. (2d)
798, 799 (C.A.A. 2nd, 1933). But see Union P. R.R. v. Field, 137
Fed. 14 (C.A.A. 8th, 1905).
5. Whether or not the jury should have been allowed to hear the
alleged prejudicial remarks depends upon whether they were in
fact prejudicial. Prejudicial appeals to the jury by inspired or
over zealous prosecutors may take any form. The most common
grounds for reversal are appeals to racial or class hatred: People
v. Simon, 80 Cal. App. 675, 252 Pac. 758 (1927) (that the defend-
ants were Jews and that the populace had grown suspicious of
all fires in which Jews were in any way connected). The cases
involving appeals to racial prejudices are particularly abundant
where negro defendants are concerned. Simmons v. State, 14 Ala.
App. 103, 71 So. 979 (1916) (that the jury should deal with the
negro defendant in light of the fact that he was a negro); Hamp-
ton v. State, 88 Miss. 257, 40 So. 545 (1906) (that mulattoes were
regros who were hated by the white race and should be despised
by every negro). Religious prejudice: Freeman v. Dempsey, 41
Ill. App. 554 (1891) (counsel called the appellee "a Jewish Christ
killer and murderer of our Savior"). References to the relative
wealth of the defendant and the poverty of his victim: Goff v.
Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 428, 44 S.W. (2d) 306 (1931) (ability of
the defendant to pay "fat fees" to combat and stall the legal
process); Sorrell v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. Rep. 100, 167 S.W. 356(1914) (reference to the wealth and influence of the accused and
the poor circumstances of the complaining witness). References
to the conduct, habits or associations of the accused: People v.
Tufts, 167 Cal. 266, 139 Pac. 78 (1914) (in prosecution for ob-
taining money under false pretenses, the prosecutor persistently
asked the accused questions intimating that he was a sexual
pervert); People v. McGraw, 66 App. Div 372 72 N.Y. Supp. 679(4th Dept. 1901) (in a prosecution for burglary, the prosecutor
alluded to the neighborhood where the defendant lived as one in-
habited by criminals, and that the defendant associated with ex-
convicts). The enumeration of these by no means completes the
list.
In Indiana the following statements by prosecuting attorneys
have been considered sufficiently prejudicial to demand a reversal
or new trial where proper preliminary steps were taken by the
accused to preserve his right to relief: "Luke Bessette has a
bad looking face. . . If his face does not show him to be a bad
man then I am not a good judge of human countenance." Bessette
v. State, 101 Ind. 85 (1884); that the prosecutor knew the saloon
keeper defendant and that "he was guilty of this and sure of
other crimes." Brow v. State, 103 Ind. 133, 2 N.E. 296 (1885);
that the wife of the defendant who was being tried for fornication
was broken hearted over the defendant's conduct and that it
was all the talk of the defendant's home town, Jackson v.
State, 116 Ind. 464, 19 N.E. 330 (1888); that murders had been
too frequent because of lax enforcement of the laws and that
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held that the alleged misconduct was not available on appeal since
the defense counsel had made no objection in the trial court. 6
Inasmuch as the general rules of procedure require that an ob-
jection be made in the trial court to prejudicial argument or conduct
and since none was made here the decision would at first appear to
be clearly supported by the weight of authority. However, the general
rule requiring objection is not without exception, and other jurisdic-
tions have long recognized that prejudicial error may be raised for
the first time on appeal where the argument or conduct was grossly
prejudicial and no curative action on the part of the court could have
assured an impartial trial.8 The Indiana Supreme Court in a recent
case, Wilson v. State,g recognized the exception and readily applied it.
the jury should make an example of the defendant, Ferguson v.
State, 49 Ind. 33( 1874).
6. "As a general rule an appellate court will not reverse a judgment
in a civil action or a conviction in a criminal prosecution because
of an improper appeal by counsel to the prejudices of the jury
where the improper appeal was not brought to the attention of the
trial court by objection during the course of the trial." Notes(1932) 78 A.L.R. 1438, 1527, (1907) 7 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 229.
7. "The rule is subject to the exception stated... that if the improper
remarks are of such character that neither rebuke nor detraction
can entirely destroy their sinister influence a new trial should
be promptly awarded regardless of the want of an objection or
exception." Note (1907) 7 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 229, 231.
8. In a prosecution for violation of the liquor laws, M'Nutt v. U.S.,
267 Fed. 670, 672 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920), the court after stating the
general rule said: "Such is undoubtedly the general rule but
there is an exception to it as firmly established as the rule itself.
It is that in criminal cases where the life or liberty of the citizen
is at stake the courts of the United States in exercise of a sound
discretion, may notice and relieve from radical errors in the trial
which appear to have been prejudicial to the rights of the defendant
although the objection they present were not properly reserved
by objection, exception, request, or assignment of error." In
Gawn v. State, 7 Ohio Cir. Dec. 19, 24 (1896) the court after assert-
ing that the remarks of the prosecuting attorney were planned to
excite passion and prejudice and lead to a decision influenced
by the prejudice so created said, "Many of these re-
marks were not objected to when made nor was the court asked
to take any action in relation to them. This we believe is not
always essential. When improper remarks are made to the jury
and it is apparent that an objection thereto would afford no redress
but only aggravate their injurious effect, the absence of objection
at the time, under such circumstances ought not preclude their
consideration upon a motion for new trial." Aetna Life Insurance
Co. v. Kelley, 70 F. (2d) 589 (C.C.A. 8th, 1934); Skuy v. U.S.,
261 Fed. 321 (C.C.A. 8th, 1920); People v. Simon, 80 Cal. App.
675, 252 Pac. 758 (1927); Starr v. Chicago, B & Q. R.R. 103
Neb. 645, 173 N.W. 682 (1919); Houston & T.C.R.R. v. Rehm, 36
Tex. Civ. App. 553, 82 S.W. 526 (1904); accord, Kansas City
Southern R.R. v. Murphy, 74 Ark. 256, 85 S.W. 428 (1905); Akin
v. State, 86 Fla. 564, 98 So. 609 (1923).
9. 222 Ind. 63, 51 N.E. (2d) 848 (1943). The case was a prosecution
for receiving stolen goods valued at less than $25.00. The defense
counsel failed to subpoena important witnesses for the defense and
in general inadequately defended the accused. The trial judge
assumed the role of an assistant prosecutor, commented upon e
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In the Wilson case the court held that procedural rules should not
prevent a consideration of prejudicial errors where fundamental civil
rights were affected. The court there allowed the prejudicial conduct of
the judge to be assigned as error in the motion for appeal even though
no objection had been made to this misconduct in the trial court.
Although the combination of prejudicial forces is different in the
Wilson and Blue cases, certainly the result-an unfair trial-seems
the same.' 0 The remarks of the prosecuting attorney in the Blue case
appear no less inflammatory or prejudicial than those that have prompt-
ed other courts to apply the exception." The gulf between the majority
and the dissent and the reason for the majority's refusal to apply the
exception 12 recognized in the Wilson case seems clearly explicable on
the basis that the majority does not believe the prosecutor's conduct
or argument was prejudicial. While a refusal to invoke the exception
is consistent with a finding of no prejudice, the premise of the majority
that the appeals were not inflammatory seems untenable in view of
remarks and arguments that the courts have previously condemned as
prejudicial error.'3
While the court found that the judge in the Wilson case was guilty
of active misfeasance and prejudicial conduct, the judge in the Blue
case remained silent when it is alleged his office demanded that he
speak and affirmatively control the argument and conduct of the
trial. 4 Though not every case can be anticipated and an inflexible
rule prescribed as to when the trial judge shall interfere on his own
motion, yet in a case of this kind where it is apparent that a high
degree of animosity is being created, charging the trial court with a
sua sponte duty is a desirable safeguard of civil rights. In view of
the recent tendency of American courts to extend the judicial protec-
evidence, and conveyed to the jury the idea that he thought the
defendant was guilty. The defense counsel made no objection to
this prejudicial conduct of the trial judge. The Indiana Supreme
Court speaking through Richman, J., unanimously reversed the de-
cision of the trial court stating that while ordinarily procedural
rules must be observed to give appellate practice the necessary or-
der and stability, yet, when it appeared from the record that a
defendant's constitutional rights of an impartial trial had been
denied, the court was free to take cognizance of the errors com-
plained of even though objection had not been made in the trial
court.
10. In the Wilson case the unfair trial resulted from the prejudicial
conduct of the judge and the lack of objection to this conduct by
incompetent defense counsel. In the Blue case the seemingly
unfair trial is a result of prejudicial argument and conduct of
the prosecuting attorney coupled with lack of objection by competent(Brief for appellant p. 85) defense counsel and a passive endorse-
ment of the prejudicial argument by a silent judge.
11. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Kelley, People v. Simon, Gawn v.
State, Houston T. C. R.R. v. Rehm, cited supra n. 8.
12. In the Blue case the majority concede the existence of the excep-
tion, p. 881.
13. See n. 5 supra.
14. Brief for Appellant, p. 88.
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tion of the civil rights of religious minorities,15 picketers,16 and speak-
ers,1 T and to reflect the mores of fair-play and justice of an American
society in cases of capital crimes,28 the Blue case stands as an incon-
gruous result-a holding that reflects the unchecked bias and blind
patriotic passion against one who exercised an unpopular right to
strike in a time of grave national emergency.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
LIMITATIONS ON FEDERAL EQUITY JURISDICTION
Appellants sought to enjoin enforcement of the 1944 "anti-closed
shop" amendment' to the Florida Constitution, alleging that it violated
the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and the contract clause'
of the United States Constitution and that it conflicted with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Acts and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.' The
district court granted a temporary restraining order and caused a
three-judge court to be convened. This court, deciding the case on
the merits, vacated the restraining order and dismissed the com-
plaint.5 On appeal to the Supreme Court, reversed and remanded with
directions to retain the bill pending determination of proceedings in
the state courts which would supply the lacking construction and
interpretation of the amendment. American Federation of Labor v.
Watson, 66 Sup. Ct. 761 (1946).
After holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear
and decide the case on the merits, that it was a proper case for a
three-judge district court, that the complaint stated a good cause of
action in equity on the grounds of threatened irreparable injury, the
Court concluded, Justice Douglas writing for the majority, 6 that it
was improper for the lower court to have ruled on the merits at this
stage of the litigation. The Court's action followed very closely its
15. E.g., the overruling of the Gobitis decision in West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Taylor v.
Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
16. E.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Carlson v. Cali-
fornia, 310 U.S. 106 (1940).
17. E.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
18. E.g., Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); Asheraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227
(1940); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
1. Fla. Const., Declaration of Rights § 12; Fla. Laws, 1943, p. 1134,
ratified at the general election Nov. 7, 1944.
2. U. S. Const. Art I, § 10.
3. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. H§ 151 et seq. (1942).
4. 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq. (1942).
5. American Federation of Labor v. Watson, 60 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D.
Fla. 1945).
6. Stone, C. J., dissented on the grounds that the bill should have
been dismissed for want of equity. Murphy, J., dissented on the
grounds that the Court should hear the appeal on the merits.
Jackson, J., took no part in the consideration of the case.
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